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WHEN IS A JUDGMENT A LIEN?
THOMAS J. HURLEY*
This question has bedeviled the legal profession in In-
diana ever since the amendment of our judgment lien law
in 1929. It seems that the confusion is largely caused by
the adherence by a considerable number of able lawyers, to
the belief that judgments become liens in the same manner
as they did prior to the amendment.'
Often in the past few years inquiries have earnestly,
but incredulously, been made, such as: "Do you mean to
say if I have a judgment in a circuit court or superior court
of this county, it is not a lien on the defendant's land, also
in this county, unless I obtain a transcript or statement of
it, file it with the clerk, pay his fees and have him enter it
in the judgment docket? You know the clerk enters all judg-
ments in his docket without a statement or transcript. Does
not that of itself make them liens?"
Prior to January 18, 1943, when the Supreme Court of
Indiana rendered its decision in Watson v. Strohl,2 the blunt
but very sufficient answer might have been to suggest to
the naive inquirer that he read the statute.3  However, the
court in that case obscured and complicated the subject in
a most regrettable fashion when it adopted this language:
"It would seem that even in the case of a money judgment,
where such judgment is to be entered in the judgment docket of
the clerk of the court rendering the judgment, it would be nec-
essary for the plaintiff to procure from the clerk a certified
copy or transcript of the judgment and then deliver it back to
the clerk for entry in the judgment docket.
"IT COULD NOT HAVE BEEN THE INTENTION OF
THE LEGISLATURE TO REQUIRE SUCH AN UNNECES-
SARY STEP. It is, of course, necessary that such a judgment
be enrolled in the judgment docket to become a lien."4
The argument may come from some quarters that, after
all, the court correctly decided that case, and that the quoted
* of the Gary bar.
1. Burns' Ind. Stat. (1933) §§ 2-2520, 2-2706; Ind. Acts 1881 (Sp.
Sess.) ch. 38, Ind. Acts 1929, ch. 83, § 2.
2. 220 Ind. 672, 46 N.E. (2d) 204 (1943).
3. Supra n. 1.
4. Supra n. 2 at p. 684.
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portion of the opinion amounts to obiter dictum only, in that
a decision of the disputed question of law applicable to the
specially found facts did not require any mention of the
method of acquiring a general, as distinguished from a spe-
cial, judgment lien, since the adversaries were each claiming
under separate sheriff's sales of a piece of land, one based on
a mechanic's lien foreclosure and the other on the foreclosure
of a corporate employee's lien, in which case the general
judgment lien law has no application, unless it were sought
to bind property other than that ordered sold under the decree.
This sounds plausible. But it overlooks the fact that the
particular question was presented and urged that one of the
parties did not have a special lien under the mechanic's lien
act because of an erroneous description of the land, which
was not reformed, and that therefore he must rely upon a
general judgment lien, which he also did not have because
of failure to file the required transcript.
However, it is not proposed here to attempt a review of
the merits of that decision in its entirety. That is not the
purpose of this article. The bare fact that there is room for
a heated discussion as to whether part of it is or is not dictum,
sufficiently makes the point that it was an injudicious treat-
ment of an important subject and, it seems to me, is certain
to cause continued and increasing uncertainty and perplexity.
In fact, the resulting confusion may be even more bewilder-
ing because of such a collateral dispute.
The writer harbors the view that the legislative purpose
was diametrically opposite to that found by the court.
The first sentence quoted above, although stated some-
what timidily, correctly spoke the law-if the court had
stopped there. But the second sentence reveals a startling
misconception of the basic reason for the amendment under
discussion. A fair understanding of the question demands
painstaking analysis because it is not by any means free
from difficulty.
, Strangely enough the whole affair started with a law-
suit in Missouri about 1925. That state had a statute5 in
essence not dissimilar to our Act of 1893, concerning the
liens of Federal judgments. The case ended in the Supreme
Court of the United States when on May 31, 1927, the then
Chief Justice, William Howard Taft, wrote the opinion in
5. Rev. Stat. Mo. 1919, §§ 1554-1556.
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Rhea v. Smith.6 It was held in that case that the Missouri
statute did not secure the needed conformity in the creation,
extent and operation of the resulting liens upon lands, as
between Federal and State courts; therefore a Federal court
judgment in Missouri attached to all lands of the judgment
debtor lying within the jurisdiction of the Federal courts of
that state.
Quickly appreciating the implications of this decision,
attorneys for the Indiana Title Association, an organization
composed of persons engaged in the abstract and title in-
surance business, urged the passage of a law in Indiana which
would attain conformity with the Act of Congress, as indicated
in Justice Taft's opinion, and appointed a committee which
drew the bill that was passed by our General Assembly and
became law on March 11, 1929.
In view of the decision of our court of last resort in
the Watson case,7 a review of the pertinent statutes of In-
diana touching judgment liens, which were in force prior to
1929 but now repealed, appears to be necessary and first in
order. They are as follows:
"The clerk of every court of record shall keep a docket in
which he shall enter, within thirty days after each term of the
court, in alphabetical order, a statement of each judgment ren-
dered at such term, containing:
First: The name at length of all the parties.
Second: The amount of the judgment and cocts, and the
date of its rendition.
Third: If the judgment be against several persons, the
statement shall be repeated under the name of
each defendant, in alphabetical order."8
"All final judgments in the Supreme and Circuit Courts for
the recovery of money or costs shall be a lien upor, real estate
and chattels real liable to execution in the county where judg-
ment is rendered for the space of ten years after the rendition
thereof, and no longer, exclusive of the time during which the
party may be restrained from proceeding thereon by any ap-
peal or injunction, or by the death of the defendant, or by
agreement of the parties entered of record."9
"It shall be the duty of the Clerk of any court of record in
this state, rendering any judgment, to make out a certified copy
6. 274 U.S. 434 (1927).
7. Supra n. 2.
8. Burns' Ind. Stat. (1926) § 634; Ind. Acts 1881 (Sp. Sess.) ch. 38,§ 587.
9. Id. H 659-601.
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thereof, under the seal of such court, at the request of any
person interested; which copy may be filed in the office of the
clerk of any circuit court of this state, and, when so filed,
shall be recorded and entered in the judgment docket in the
same manner as judgments rendered in any such court."'1
"Transcripts from United States Courts.-1. Any person in-
terested may file, or cause to be filed, in the office of the
clerk of any circuit court in this state, a copy of any judgment
rendered by the district or circuit courts of the United States
in and for the district of Indiana, certified by the clerk of, and
under the seal of, such court of the United States, and when
so filed, the same shall be entered in the order book and judg-
ment docket in the same manner as judgments rendered in any
such circuit court of the State of Indiana."
"Lien.-2. Such judgment, from the time of filling the copy
aforesaid, shall be a lien upon all the real estate, including
chattels real, of the judgment debtor situated in the county
where filed, as fully as if such judgment had been rendered
therein."
"Fees of Clerk.-3. The same fees shall be taxed, charged
and received by the clerk of such circuit court for so filing,
recording and entering such copy as are taxed, charged and
received by him according to law for filing, recording, and
entering transcripts of judgments, for like purposes, rendered
by the courts of record of this state.""
It is also necessary to recall that in 1888 the Congress
passed an act concerning the liens of Federal judgments and
decrease, which has remained in effect continuously ever
since that time and is still in force. This statute seems to
have been quite generally overlooked, or misunderstood, in
this state as well as many others, except for the brief rec-
ognition accorded to it following the decision in the Rhea
case, supra.
The text of the act, including the title, follows:
"An act to regulate the liens of the judgments and decrees
of the Courts of the United States.
"Be it enacted by the Senate and the House of Representa-
tives in Congress assembled,
That the judgments and decrees rendered in a district court
of the United States within any State, shall be liens on prop-
erty throughout such State in the same manner and to the
same extent and under the same conditions only as if such judg-
ments and decrees had been rendered by a court of general
jurisdiction of such State. Whenever the laws of any State
require a judgment or decree of a State court to be registered,
10. Id. §§ 662, 603.
11. Id. §§ 664-666; Ind, Acts 1893, ch. 44( §§ 1-3.
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recorded, docketed, indexed, or any other thing to be done, in
a particular manner, or in a certain office or county, or parish
in the State of Louisiana, before a lien shall attach, this sec-
tion and section 813 of this chapter shall be applicable therein
whenever and only whenever the laws of such State shall au-
thorize the judgments and decrees of the United States courts
to be registered, recorded, docketed, indexed, or otherwise
conformed to the rules and requirements relating to the judg-
ments and decrees of the courts of the State."12
Section 813 requires clerks of United States courts to prepare
and keep in their offices, indices of all judgment-debtors in
the judgments and decrees in such courts; and Section 814
provides that such judgments shall cease to be liens at like
periods as those of State courts.
The last sentence of section 812 was enacted to avoid the
hardship resulting from the ignorance of citizens of Federal
judgment liens on their property which were not of record
in the county where the property was located.'8
At this stage it should be apparent that the laws of this
state, prior to 1929, did not succeed in limiting the territorial
scope of Federal judgments as were those of the State courts;
that is, not under identical terms and conditions.
This is so because the duty was imposed upon the Fed-
eral judgment-holder of obtaining and paying for a tran-
script and filing it in the office of the clerk of the state
court, where he also had to pay another fee, and no such
duty or burden was imposed on the State judo'Ment-holder,
except in cases where his judgment came fron a different
county.
There was but one method of escaping this result; it
was to impose by law upon every holder of every judgment
who wished to make his claim a lien, the uniform obligation of
obtaining a transcript, filing it in the county where the
land sought to be bound was situated, and by paying the
statutory fees. And this must apply, unavoidably, to all
judgments, State or Federal, even when rendered in the very
county where the debtor's land lay.
Any and all arguments to the contrary were swept aside
and effectively settled when Chief Justice Taft, in his opinion,
said:
12. 28 USCA § 812.
13. Lineker v. Dillon, 275 Fed. 460 (1921).
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"It is clear that Congress by the first section of the Act of
August 1, 1889 . . . intended to change and limit the existing
rule, as stated by this court in Massingill v. Downs, 7 How.
760; 12 L.Ed, 903, that Federal court judgments were a lien
upon lands throughout the territorial jurisdiction of the re-
spective Federal Courts, but intended to do this only in those
states which passed laws making the conditions of creation,
scope and territorial application of the liens of Federal court
judgments the same as State court judgments, so that where
any state has not passed such laws, the rule that Federal
court judgments are liens throughout the territorial jurisdiction
of such courts must still be in force ...
"We are dealing here with a question necessarily of great
nicety in determining the effect and the priority of liens upon
real estate, and the subject requires exactness ...
"Congress did not intend to change the rule that Federal
court judgments were liens on lands throughout the territorial
jurisdiction of the respective Federal courts except in those
states which passed laws making the conditions of creation,
scope and territorial application of liens of Federal court judg-
ments the same as State court judgments ...
"With respect to the equality required as between Federal
and State judgments, A SLIGHT INEQUALITY IS FATAL.
MERE APPROXIMATE CONFORMITY WILL NOT DO, es-
pecially where complete conformity is possible."'' 4
Under the Missouri statute above cited, the Hens of
Federal judgments on lands in the county in which the court
sits can not attach, unless a transcript of the judgment shall
be made and filed in the office of the clerk of the State court
in that county, though no such transcript of a judgment in
a State court is required before its lien becomes effective;
hence the conformity affecting the creation, scope and terri-
torial application of the liens of Federal and State court
jdgments, required by the Federal act, does not exist, and
under the rule prevailing before enactment of such a statute,
Federal court judgments are liens throughout the territorial
jurisdiction of such courts without filing a transcript.
The Supreme Court of Missouri, from which the Rhea
case was appealed, erroneously held that the Federal judg-
ment-holder could not be harmed or prejudiced as to the
time of effectiveness of his lien by any delay in filing his
transcript, since his lien was supposed to attach at the time
of the rendition of the judgment; however, Justice Taft very
aptly answered:
14. Supra n. 6 at 442.
[Vol. 20
WHEN IS A JUDGMENT A LIEN?
"The risk is in the danger that the judgment creditor's attor-
ney may forget to file a transcript, the State judgment-holder
having a lien without being required to even remember that
a transcript should be filed."'15
It is now obvious that our Indiana judgment lien law,
prior to 1929, was subject to the same infirmity as those of
Missouri, especially our act of 1893. It then became a ques-
tion of policy, whether we wished State court judgments to
be confined to the limits of the county where rendered,
while Federal judgments remain state wide in scope, without
regard to the filing of a transcript. The consensus of the
committee of the Indiana Title Association was against this,
and their view was adopted by our legislature at the 1929
session.16
It is scarcely necessary to point out that this law was
designed to accomplish a revolutionary change in the mode
of creating general judgment liens upon lands in Indiana.
The repealing section is very broad, expressly abrogating
all laws in conflict with its terms and specifically voiding
certain others.
The effect was to completely destroy the lien of every
judgment then existing in the state prior to the effective
date of the act, but permitting the holders to restore them
by following the new method, and thereafter to require all
judgment-holders, on equal terms, to follow the procedure
set up if they wished to create liens.
Judgments for money or costs become general liens upon
lands solely by statutory authority, and there must be a sub-
stantial compliance with the requirements of such statutes
or there is no lien.
"Judgment Hens are created by statute, and the requirements
of the statute giving a lien must be complied with or none
exists . . . for a judgment merely becomes a general lien
when all has been done by the judgment creditor which the
law requires.
"Entering and docketing transcripts of judgments rendered
in a different county are not simply methods of supplying
notice, but they are essential acts which create a lien. A
transcript of a judgment lying in the vaults of a Clerk's office,
15. Supra n. 6 at 434.
16. Supra n. 1.
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neither entered or docketed, is no more a lien on lands in that
county than the last week's newspaper received by the clerk." 17
If we were at liberty to disregard the court's interpreta-
tion in the Watson case and apply the act according to its
evident intent, it would be a great accomplishment in the
interest of order and clarity; but this we cannot do.18
Another phase deserving some attention concerns judg-
ments of superior courts which have been established in
fourteen counties of this state. They are original, general
jurisdiction, practically co-ordinate with the circuit courts.
In each instance the clerk of the circuit court is made ex
officio clerk of the superior court. Each of these courts sit at
the county seat, with the exception of Elkhart, Lake and
La Porte, where they are located in other cities. Allen, St.
Joseph and Vigo counties each have two such courts, while
Lake and Marion each have five.
Separate judgment dockets are provided by law for all
of them, save Elkhart, Delaware, Grant, Lake and La Porte.
These five are required to use the dockets of the respective
circuit courts. However, in the case of Elkhart, Lake and La
Porte, the situs being apart from the circuit courts, the
statutes establishing them directed the clerks to enter their
judgments in the circuit court dockets within forty-eight
hours after rendition. This is not so in Delaware and Grant,
presumably because they occupy the same building with their
circuit courts.
The Indiana Act of 1895, ch. 104, §11, creating the Lake-
Porter-Laporte Superior court, and Acts 1907, ch. 5, §7, es-
tablishing the one in Elkhart county, provide:
"Said court shall be a court of record and of general juris-
diction at law and equity and its judgments, decrees, orders
and proceedings shall have the same force and effect as those
of the circuit court, and shall be enforced in the same manner:
Provided, That the clerk of said court shall within forty-eight
(48) hours after the rendition of any judgment in said superior
court cause the same to be entered in the judgment docket of
the circuit court of such county in the same manner and to the
17. Bell v. Davis, 75 Ind. 314 (1881); Petrovich v. Witholm, 85 Ind.
App. 144, 152 N.E. 849 (1926).
18. "When a statute has been construed by the highest court, havingjurisdiction to pass on it, such construction is as much a part
of the statute as if plainly written into it originally." 59 Corpus
Juris. § 613; cf. 3 Sutherland, Stat. Constr. (3d ed.) 1 5105.
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same extent that judgments of the circuit court are required
to be entered therein."
House Bill No. 416 became law at the 1945 session of
the Indiana General Assembly, amending Section 11 of the
Act of 1895, by eliminating the proviso concerning entry of
judgments within forty-eight hours, but made no reference
to Section 7 of the Act of 1907, thus ostensibly leaving it
in effect as to the superior court of Elkhart county.
It could, and perhaps should, be assumed that the law-
makers realized the full import of the 1929 amendment un-
der discussion, and sought to clarify the matter, at least in
part, but overlooked the situation in Elkhart county. How-
ever, it seems certain that both of these sections were re-
pealed by the amendment of 1929, because since that time
judgments should be entered in the docket only upon request
of the holders, after procuring statements or transcripts
thereof. Our legislature might better have taken notice of
the condition created by the court's decision in the Watson
case and directed their effort toward curing the mischief
resulting from it.
It also could have removed any possible doubt concerning
the status of separate judgment dockets in those superior
courts where that requirement prevails. Such a doubt, how-
ever, is more speculative than real, because it is clear that
the same 1929 amendment repealed the provisions for such
separate dockets, if not expressly then by necessary implica-
tion.
If it is true that "IT COULD NOT HAVE BEEN THE
INTENTION OF THE LEGISLATURE TO REQUIRE SUCH
AN UNNECESSARY STEP" as the filing of a transcript or
statement, then the judgment lien act of 1929 was a piece
of legislative caprice, wholly devoid of meaning or purpose.
But it seems to this writer that it represents a first rate job
of attaining conformity with the Federal act and that., by its
interpretation, the Supreme Court has nullified its valid ob-
jective.
A law expressly forbidding clerks to enter any judg-
ment, State or Federal, in the judgment docket until after
the filing in his office of a transcript or statement thereof,
and the payment of the satutory fees, is perhaps now the only
- effective remedy.
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